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I. THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE "EFFECTS" DOCTRINE IN
ANTITRUST LAW
The "effects" doctrine is a basis of jurisdiction which was de-
veloped in order to reach aliens abroad whose conduct occurs be-
yond the borders of the enforcing State, but has an effect within
that State.1 Its origin lies in the "objective" application of the ter-
ritorial principle.2 The doctrine asserts that activities abroad, even
those of foreign citizens, may be regulated because of their impact
on interests within the territorial State's domain.8 It seeks to sat-
isfy the concept of territoriality by treating the impact of the pro-
hibited conduct as much a part of the crime as the conduct itself.
In this respect, two important issues arise. First, what is
meant by the "effect" of the conduct as opposed to the actual con-
duct. Second, how substantial an "effect" is necessary to support
jurisdiction.'
* Associate, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C. This article is part of the author's
doctoral thesis written at Cambridge University, Cambridge, England.
1. W. FUIGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 37 (2d ed. 1973); see Kint-
ner and Haligasten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign Trade and
Commerce - Variations on "American Banana" Since 1909, 15 B. C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
343 (1973); Simson, The Return of "American Banana": A Contemporary Perspective on
American Antitrust Abroad, 9 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 233 (1974).
2. B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COM-
PARATIVE GUIDE 32 (1979).
3. INT'L LAW Ass'N REPORT OF THE FTrry-FmrST CONFERENCE 369 (Tokyo 1964) [herein-
after cited as TOKYO REPORT].
4. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945), (a
"substantial" or a "direct" effect was called for) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa]; United States
v. Hamburg -Amerikanische P.F.A. Gesellschaft, 200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (the contract
directly and materially affects foreign commerce) rev'd on other grounds, 239 U.S. 466
(1916); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (the combination affected the foreign com-
merce of this country); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949)
(although there is no showing as to the extent of commerce restrained, the contract deleteri-
ously affected U.S. commerce); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513,
(S.D.N.Y. 1945) (with the effect of suppressing imports into and exports from the United
States), mod. and aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83
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Case law has tended to reflect the confusion as to what stan-
dard should be applied to determine not only what an "effect" is,
but also to what degree such an effect must be present.' In United
States v. General Electric Co., for instance, the court required,
that the effects be direct and substantial.' However, in the recent
decision of Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,
the court held that the "effects" were sufficient if they were either
direct or substantial." On the other hand, United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America required evidence that the violators had in-
tended to affect, and had actually affected foreign commerce. 8 One
writer goes so far as to suggest that there need not be any effect on
commerce as long as the act occurs in the course of foreign com-
merce.' Confusion prevails not only as to the determination of a
proper test for effects, but also as to the definition of the terms
used to delineate the extent of the impact necessary for jurisdic-
tion to attach. The standards relied on by the courts range from a
requirement of direct or substantial to a requirement of direct and
substantial.
The International Law Association applied the principles used
in cases of common crimes 0 to the effects of economic activity
abroad and stated:
The Restatement recognizes that to admit "effects" as a basis of
jurisdiction without any qualification as to degree would be to
permit well-established principles of international jurisdiction to
be overturned by a sidewind [which, it may be added has blown
F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (a direct and influencing effect on trade between the United
States and foreign countries.); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp.
504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (a conspiracy which which affects American commerce); Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbon & Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (a conspiracy to monop-
olize or restrain "domestic or foreign commerce of the United States");
5. Jennings, General Course on International Law, 121 REcURIL DES CoUis 329, 524
(1967).
6. 82 F. Supp. 753, (D.N.J. 1949); see also W. FUCATE, supra note 1, at; KINTNER &
JoEISON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 26 (1974); Art. 5, Principles of International
Law, as adopted by the INT'L LAW ASS'N REPORT OF THE Firry-zi m CONFERENCE 139 (NEW
YORK 1972) [hereinafter cited as NEW YORK REPORT].
7. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied 409
U.S. 950 (1972).
8. Alcoa, supra note 4, at 444; see also ABA, ANTrrus'r LAW DEvELoPMENTs 360 (1975).
9. Rahi, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American Antitrust Laws, 43 Awn-
TRUST L.J. 521, 523 (1974).
10. In cases of common crimes such as fraud and homicide, the conduct and effect are
so strongly interconnected that the conduct cannot be classified as criminal but for the
effect.
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consistently from one direction only]. It attempts, therefore, to
introduce a more positive nexus between cause and effect by re-
quiring that the effects be substantial.11
An American writer adds to this idea that United States courts
"have assumed jurisdiction under the antitrust laws over acts and
contracts substantially and directly affecting, or interfering with,
United States foreign trade even though such acts were done, or
contracts executed outside of our borders.""2
Despite these formulations of principle, both in the United
States and Europe, the need to define "substantiality" still re-
mains. It is useful to consider this term in light of the applications
of United States' antitrust laws to extraterritorial acts since it is a
familiar term in American antitrust law. It is used in exclusive
dealing arrangements, tying clauses, and other situations under
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Sherman Act derives its authority from Section 1:
"Every contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations is declared to be ile-
gal.",13 Furthermore, for Section 1 to be applicable, the restraint
must be shown to have a "direct and substantial effect" 1' on either
foreign or interstate commerce. In a majority of the foreign com-
merce cases, when the term "substantial" is used, it seems to imply
that the effect of the restraint must not be too slight or de
minimis.15 Even though the courts may rely on this standard, they
do not make an effort to measure the magnitude of the effect. The
Clayton Act' suffers from the same lack of clarity as the Sherman
Act. The test of Clayton is whether a "not insubstantial amount of
interstate commerce" is affected."
The differences between the expressions used by the courts in
assuming jurisdiction are more apparent than real, for each repre-
sents a legal conclusion that the relationship between the restraint
11. INT'L LAW ASS'N REPORT OF THE FlrrY-iouRTH cONFEREN E 235 (The Hague 1970)
[hereinafter cited as HAGUE RPoarT].
12. W. FUGATE, SUpra note 1, at 20.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
14. W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 55.
15. The "footnote fifty-nine" statement in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940), that "the amount of interstate or foreign trade involved is not
material ... since Section 1 of the [Sherman] Act brands as illegal the character of the
restraint and not the amount of commerce affected."
16. Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. § 12.
17. Id.
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and United States commerce is sufficient to justify the finding of
jurisdiction."8 However, the problem still remains with the vague-
ness of the "substantial and direct" standards. 19
The Attorney General's National Committee Report took a
different approach in determining a standard when it stated a sub-
stantiality requirement whose content was mixed with the law's
substantive standards of unreasonableness: "[Tihe Sherman Act
applies only to those arrangements ... which have such substan-
tial anti-competitive effects on this country's 'trade or commerce
with foreign nations' as to constitute unreasonable restraints.
2 0
This standard, however, does not appear to have met with judicial
approval.
Finally, one authority is of the view that:
The elements of directness and substantiality may be viewed as
expressing different ways of asking whether the facts rise to the
level of Congressional concern. The relative importance of either
would thus vary inversely with changes in the strength of the
showing of the other. The less "direct" the restraint is, the more
important it becomes to make a convincing showing that it pro-
duces a substantial effect. For example, a particular restraint
carried out in a foreign market without being a part of an Amer-
ican export or import transaction may be in an "indirect" rela-
tion to American commerce; it might nevertheless be brought
within the law, but only if a strong case of effect on American
exports or imports is made. Conversely, if a restraint is so much
a part of a foreign commerce transaction that it is easily seen to
have a quite "direct" relation to that commerce, it becomes un-
important to ask how substantial it is.sl
The preceding analysis of the "direct and substantial effect" test
18. See Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Department's Antitrust Guide International
Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 204, 224-25 (1978).
19. Although most of this discussion revolves around substantiality, the directness stan-
dard suffers from the same basic flaws. "Directness" as a standard has both the flexibility
and the vagueness of the "proximate cause" formula of tort law, which it closely follows.
COMMON MARKET AND AmmucAN 'rTmusr. OVERLAP AND CONFLICT, 61 (Rahi ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as COMMON MARKEr].
20. Arv. GEN. NAT. Comm. ANTrrRusT Rae. 76 (1955). The ABA ANTImUST SECTION
SuPP. TO ATTy. GEN. NAT. COMM. ANTrrRUST REP., ANTrRUST DEvELOPMENTS: 1955-1968, at
47 (1968), summarized the rule, in light of the Restatement, as being that the scope of the
antitrust laws "includes the conduct of American nationals, wherever it occurs, if the con-
duct has substantial anticompetitive effects on the commerce of the United States with for-
eign nations."
21. COMMON MARKET, supra note 19 at 64-65.
[Vol. 14
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indicates that although there has been a great deal of discussion
about the "directness" and "substantiality" of the effects, no ef-
forts have been made to define or outline any criteria for either of
the two requirements. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that
the absence of any guidelines results in greater delegation of dis-
cretion to the courts than would exist if there were a self-contained
test or measure.
In the antitrust area, the doctrine of "effects" is generally ac-
cepted in the United States. The commission of the European Eco-
nomic Community has substantially adopted the doctrine of "ef-
fects" in applying its competition rules. Despite the apparent
trend, the exact scope of the doctrine has not yet been precisely
delineated.
The doctrine of "effects" was first introduced to antitrust law
in the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in the Alcoa case." This
opinion became the foundation for the application of the "effects"
doctrine in the antitrust area. In Alcoa, the United States moved
from the use of "acts" occurring simultaneously in and out of the
territory, to "economic effects" within the territory (unaccompa-
nied by the "acts" occurring within the territory) as a jurisdic-
tional base.2a In prior antitrust cases, some act essential to effectu-
ate the restraint had occurred within the country, and the
defendants had included United States corporations. " With the
exception of Alcoa, all foreign commerce decisions upholding Sher-
man Act jurisdiction were based in whole or in part upon allega-
tions or proof of some conduct within the United States. In the
case of foreign defendants, they were found to have either acted or
allegedly acted within the United States or abroad pursuant to an
agreement with a United States party who had acted within the
United States.25 For instance the controversial case of United
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
contained allegations of conduct with the United States by domes-
tic and foreign members of a Swiss Cartel whose primary purpose
was allegedly to regulate the prices of watches exported from Swit-
22. Alcoa, supra note 4.
23. COMMON MARKET, supra note 19, at 382.
24. Id.
25. The cartel cases explain this argument: See e.g., United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus. Ltd. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), a/f'd. 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. General Elec-
tric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1945), a/f'd. 332 US. 319 (1947).
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zerland to the U.S.2' Alcoa thus became the landmark case in
which jurisdiction against foreign nationals1  was based solely on
the "effects" of foreign acts within the United States.
In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand stated that acts committed by
aliens outside of the territorial United States are within the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the United States courts under the Sher-
man Act "if they were intended to affect imports [into the United
States] and did affect them,"2 notwithstanding the fact that no
United States party was involved in this phase of the case and no
act took place in the United States. The issue before the court was
whether the participation of Aluminum Limited, a Canadian cor-
poration formed to take over the properties of the Aluminum Com-
pany of America outside the United States, in an "alliance" with
certain other foreign producers of ingot, was a violation of the
United States antitrust laws. In determining whether Congress in-
tended the Sherman Act to apply to an "alliance" agreement,
Judge Hand effectively adopted's what was later to be known as an
26. See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc. (1963)
Trade Cas. para. 70, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, (1965) Trade Cas. para. 71, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) thereinafter referred to as Swiss Watch].
27. The fact that a party is a United States national should not by itself support Sher-
man Act jurisdiction. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OP THE UNITED
STATES, § 30 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMErr]; See e.g., Pacific Seafarers Inc. v.
Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093
(1969).
28. Alcoa, supra note 4, at 444.
29. Specifically, Judge Hand wrote:
[Wie are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the
conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it. That being
so, the only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability,
and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so; as a court of the United
States we cannot look beyond our own law. Nevertheless, it is quite true that we
are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without regard to the
limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers;
limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the "Conflict of Laws."
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can
catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States. Ameri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 213 U.S. 347, 357; United States v. Bowman,
260 U.S. 94, 98; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437. On the other hand
it is settled law - as "Limited" itself agrees that any State may impose liabili-
ties, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders which the State reprehends; and these
liabilities other States will ordinarily recognize. Strassheim v. Daily 221 U.S. 280,
284, 285: Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60,65, 66; Ford v. United States, 273,
U.S. 593, 620, 621; Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 65.
Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful had they been made within
the United States; and it follows from what we have just said that both were
19821 APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS
"intent-effects" test:
i) There must be both an intent to and an effect on United
States imports or exports for application of the Sherman Act;
ii) If there is an effect but no intent, then there is no Sherman
Act jurisdiction because of the "international complications
likely to arise" which in turn make it "safe to assume that Con-
gress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them."
iii) And if there is an intent but no effect, it was held that the
Sherman Act does not apply.8° But at the same time, however, it
had been stated that there need be no actual intent to violate
the antitrust laws.31 In fact, a foreigner might violate these laws
without fully understanding them or, in an extreme situation,
without even knowing they exist.
8 '
The decision in Alcoa actually represented a deviation from
prior holdings of the United States courts. Although Judge Hand
called it "settled law," the statement was not entirely accurate, at
least not in 1945. 83 Nevertheless, it has since become settled law in
the United States..4 The most important feature of the Alcoa case
was the extension of the traditional application of the objective
territorial principle of jurisdiction to the economic effects of wholly
foreign conduct of a kind which other nations generally did not
recognize as a crime or even as a tort."8
unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did
affect them....
30. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 28.
31. See United States v. General Elec. Co., supra note 4, at 891; KIrrER AND JOELSON,
supra note 6 at 27-28.
32. This position seems to be suggested by KINTNER AND JOELSON Id., as well as by
FUGATE, supra note 1, at 48.
33. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 33.
34. The "effects" doctrine or some variation thereof has also appeared outside the anti-
trust area, such as securities regulation.
35. COMMON MARKET, supra note 19, at 384-85; Professor Jennings stated that the ap-
plication of the objective territorial principle "to a trade arrangement made between aliens
abroad which has repercussions on United States imports or exports... becomes no longer
a fulfillment, but a reversal of the principle of territoriality." This explains, he states, "the
controversy which has long dogged the judgment of. . . [Judge Hand in Alcoa], a decision
not right on the merits but highly controversial in its reasoning. From the proposition that
'it is settled law that any State may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders'; the
Judge felt able to say of the agreements in question: [quoting last paragraph of excerpt from
Judge Hand: opinion set forth at supra note 291. But of course the fact is that there can be
very little in the way of significant commercial activity that does not have repercussions
upon United States trade. The principle of territoriality has at this point become void of
real contact and has become a mere way of talking whilst exercising extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion." Supra note 4 at 519-20.
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The decision in Alcoa, viewed as a statement on international
law, has been subject to a vast array of critical comments by both
American 3 and foreign writers.37 There have been three major crit-
icisms. First, the adoption of the "effects" doctrine of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction is considered to be inconsistent with the principles
of public international law." Second, the application of the "ef-
fects" doctrine is considered to be an export of one State's eco-
nomic and political values to other States.39 Third, the "intent and
effect" test effectively adopted in Alcoa, is considered to lack clar-
ity and be of questionable operability."'
As to the first criticism, there is no doubt that international
law is not sufficiently clear regarding the exact limits of the extra-
territorial application of national legislation.4' Moreover, United
States judges have a different perception of international law as
compared to the international law jurists.'"
The second criticism relates to the application of the doctrine
of "effects." The classic statement of the doctrine appears in the
36. See, e.g. Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-
trust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61
AM. J. INT'L. L. 558 (1967); Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and
the Antitrust Laws, 63 YAZ L.J. 655 (1954). Contra, Timberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Under the Sherman Act, 11 REc. OF BAR ASS'N OF Crr oF N.Y. 101 (1956); Cf. Brewster,
Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: "An Appraisal," 11 ABA ANrrrRUsT
SEC rION Ra. 65, 69 (1957); Miller, Extraterritorial Effects of Trade Regulation, 111 U; PA.
L. REv. 1092. (1963).
37. Jennings, supro note 5; Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law,
111 RECU.IL DES COURS 1, 100-06 (1964); Kahn-Freund, Extraterritorial Application of An-
titrust Laws, ABA SECTION OF INT'L. & Comp. L. 1957 PROCEEDINGS 33; Verzijl, The Contro-
versy Regarding the So-Called Extraterritorial Effect of the American Antitrust Laws, 8
NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIr VOOR INT'L RzcHT 3 (1961); TOKYO REPORT, supra note 3, at 370-
84 (Riedweg, Rapporteur); Cf., Report to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope by the Legal Committee (deGrailly, Rapporteur), The Extra-Territorial Application of
Anti-Trust Legislation, Doc. 2023 (Jan. 25, 1966).
38. Supra notes 32 and 33.
39. This kind of criticism is aimed more towards the extraterritorial application of anti-
trust laws rather than with Alcoa's test. For a recent Canadian criticism, see Stanford, The
Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View from
Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 195, 210-11 (1978).
40. Hawk's work sets footh these three criticisms. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 31.
41. E.g., cf. COMMON MARKET, supra note 19, ch. 7.; See generally, I. BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW Ch. XIV (2d ed. 1973); 6 WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 118-83 (1968).
42. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th
Cir. 1976), the court stated:
"[lit is evident that at some point the interests of the United States are too
weak and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction."
[Vol. 14
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majority opinion of the S.S. Lotus decision of the Permanent
Court of International Justice.4" The Lotus, a French ship, collided
on the high seas with a Turkish ship, resulting in the drowning of a
number of persons on board the Turkish ship. On arrival of the
Lotus in Turkey, the Turkish Government brought criminal pro-
ceedings for involuntary manslaughter against the officer of the
watch on the Lotus, pursuant to a Turkish law providing for pun-
ishment of any foreigner who "commits an offense abroad to the
prejudice of Turkey or of a Turkish subject ... ." The case was
brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice,
where France argued that such prosecution is a violation of inter-
national law. A majority of the Court sustained Turkey's right to
proceed on the basis of the territorial principle, stating:
No argument has come to the knowledge of the Court from
which it could be deduced that states recognize themselves to be
under an obligation towards each other only to have regard to
the place where the author of the offence happens to be at the
time of the offence. On the contrary it is certain that the courts
of many countries, even of countries which have given their
criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret
criminal law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at
the moment of commission are in the territory of another State,
are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the
national territory, if one of the constituent elements of the of-
fence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there
Consequently, once it is admitted that the effects of the offence
were produced on the Turkish vessel, it becomes impossible to
hold that there is a rule of international law which prohibits
Turkey from prosecuting Lieutenant Demons because of the fact
that the author of the offence was on board the French ship."
The Permanent Court in the Lotus case was dealing with an in-
stance of direct physical harm - a collision on the high seas -
and it is certain that they had no thought that this case would be
adapted to such diverse cases as those relating to extraterritorial
application of the antitrust laws." The Court itself felt "obliged
, * * to recall that its examination is strictly confined to the specific
situation in the present case, for it is only in regard to this situa-
tion that its decision is asked for."
43. S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser A, No. 10 at 22 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
44. Id. at 23.
45. Jennings, supra note 5, at 520.
1982]
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In a discussion of the Lotus decision and its applicability to a
situation factually diverse from that of Lotus, Professor Jennings
states:
It is reasonable nevertheless to look at the principle as it is ex-
pressed in the judgment to see whether it contains within itself
qualifications that might assist in a different kind of case. The
term effects which has been erected into a doctrine means of
itself nothing more than results or consequences. But it is not
the single, unqualified word "effects," which forms the principle
on which the Court relied, but the whole phrase .... This
shows that by "effects" is meant activity that is not a mere re-
percussion or consequence, but activity that is a 'constituent ele-
ment' of the crime charged. s
If the constituent element of an offense takes place in a State's
territory, a proper identification of the "constituent elements" suf-
ficient to comprise a specific economic crime is required. The prob-
lem with this approach is that what might be considered a "con-
stituent element" by State A in a particular crime may not be
treated in the same manner by State B. The Restatement
elucidates:
The fact that a substantial number of States with reasonably
developed legal systems do not recognize certain conduct and its
effects as constituent elements of crime or torts does not prevent
a State which chooses to do so from prescribing rules which
make such conduct and its effects as constituent elements of ac-
tivity which is either criminal, tortious or subject to
regulations. 7
To use "constituent elements" as a basis of assuming jurisdic-
tion without any fixed criteria is to give the states wide discretion
to interpret the concept of "constituent element," thereby causing
further controversy. Nevertheless, the "effects" doctrine has been
adapted by the Common Market.'
8
The third criticism of Alcoa - lack of clarity and operational
vagueness - is probably the most severe." One writer states that
46. Id., at 520-21.
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, at 50.
48. B. HAWK, supra note 2, Ch. 8.
49. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 34.
In dealing with the element of intent in foreign trade it is important to draw a distinc-
tion between an intent to affect U.S. foreign trade and an intent to restrain such trade. The
former, if it has any relevance at all, has to do with jurisdiction: Did the acts or contracts in
question directly and substantially affect U.S. foreign trade?
[Vol. 14
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"while the Alcoa 'intent and effect' test may appear simple in its
formulation, its actual operation belies such simplicity."50 Al-
though Judge Hand relied on "intent" and "effect", one might say
that "intent" is the more important of the two elements of the Al-
coa test.5 1 However, there is another writer who argues that Alcoa
is essentially an "effects" tort, and that the "intent" is not of pri-
mary importance. "The necessary intent is merely a general intent
to affect U.S. commerce and may be satisfied by the rule that a
person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his ac-
tions. Thus, if effects are demonstrated, proof of intent would not
appear to be a great problem."5 " It would seem that to opt for ei-
ther one of the two elements as more important than the other is
highly controversial.
5 '
Considering the question of intent without actual effect first, Judge Hand in Alcoa
stated that "for argument we shall assume that the act does not cover agreements, even
though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its performance is shown actually to
have had some effect upon them." Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
The governing rule in interstate commerce is that a contract or conspirary to restrain
trade is illegal irrespective of whether put into practice or not, and in cases other than
Alcoa, there is considerable authority for the proposition that it is sufficient in foreign trade
cases for the government in an antitrust action merely to show an unlawful contract.
The question now to be considered is, whether there must be a specific intent to re-
strain trade, assuming that the acts come within the U.S. foreign trade jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act. As far as interstate commerce is concerned the rule is clear. The Supreme
Court in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. stated: "If the necessary direct and
immediate effect of the contract be to violate an act of Congress and also to restrain and
regulate interstate commerce, it is manifestly immaterial whether the design to so regulate
was or was not in existence when the contract was entered into." 175 U.S. 211, 234 (1899).
Earlier in the opinion, 175 U.S. at 228, the Court stated that Congress had the power to
prohibit contracts "where the natural and direct effect of such a contract will be, when
carried out, to directly and not as a mere incident to other and innocent purposes regulate
to any substantial extent interstate commerce. (And, when we speak of interstate commerce,
we also include in our meaning foreign commerce.)" See also, United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 108 (1948); United States v. Patten 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913). This rule has also
been applied generally in the foreign commerce cases.
In United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949), in an
answer to an objection by the foreign company, the court quoted from Griffith that a spe-
cific intent is not always necessary and that "[ilt is sufficient that a restraint of trade, or
monopoly results as the consequence of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements."
United States v. Griffith 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948). "Thus it would appear that in foreign as
well as in interstate commerce, no specific intent to restrain foreign trade is required and an
intent to restrain is presumed if the direct and natural consequences of the acts of the
parties have that effect." W. FuGATz, supra note 1, at 51.
50. W. FuGATz, Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 48.
53. "Fugate's argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with
Hand's unequivocal statement that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply
where there are effects but no intent. Second, and more importantly, application of the
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Since 1945 a number of reformulations of Alcoa have been of-
fered. In 1955 the report of the Attorney General's Committee to
study antitrust laws stated:
We feel that the Sherman Act applies only to those arrange-
ments between Americans alone, or in concert with foreign
firms, which have such substantial anti-competitive effects on
this country's "trade or commerce ... with foreign nations" as
to constitute unreasonable restraints ....
We believe that conspiracies between foreign competitors alone
should come within the Sherman Act only where they are in-
tended to, and actually do result in substantial anti-competitive
effects on our foreign commerce."
Nevertheless, Alcoa became the major source of support for the
controversial rule of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, which states:
18. Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Effect within
Territory.
A State has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attach-
ing legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its
territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conducts and its effects are generally recognized as
constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of
states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effects are constituent ele-
ments of activity to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principle of
justice generally recognized by states that have reason-
ably developed legal systems."
It has been observed by one writer that "[tihis draft is by no
means free from difficulty, not least in introducing a question of
causation into the equation... ."' In addition, the principle of
jurisdiction expounded by Judge Hand in Alcoa and stated in the
Sherman Act in such a situation would cover an overly broad range of arrangements, many
of which would neither implicate the policies underlying the Sherman Act nor be of suffi-
cient implication to justify the resulting enforcement costs and possible international con-
flicts." B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 34.
54. ATrY. GKN. NATL Comm. Amrrrausr REP., supra note 20, at 76.
55. REmSATBmarr, supra note 27, § 18.
56. Jennings, supra note 5, at 521.
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Restatement has not been subscribed to by all states having rea-
sonably developed legal systems. 7 It has been further stated that
57. A European Advisory Committee, with Lord McNair as Chairman, and Professors
Francois Seidl-Hohenveldern and Johnson as Reporter and Secretary, respectively, was ap-
pointed by the American Law Institute in 1958 to advise on certain sections of the draft
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States relating to jurisdiction.
While certain revisions were made on the recommendation of this Committee, the recom-
mendations relating to the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to conduct occurring outside
the territory of the prescribing State were not adopted.
The draft Section on scope of jurisdiction submitted to the Committee reads as follows:
8. A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules attaching legal consequences to con-
duct, including rules relating to property, status or other interests, with respect
to conduct occurring:
(a) in its territory;
(b) partly within and partly outside its territory;
(c) entirely outside its territory if the conduct has, or is intended to have, effects
within its territory which have a reasonably close relationship to the conduct.
TOKYO REPORT, supra note 3, at 537.
The European Advisory Committee's report on this draft said:
We propose here a major change, the first major change we have so far proposed.
This is that paragraph (c) should be deleted ....
The principal reason is simply one of logic. We do not see how a State's
jurisdiction to prescribe rules relating to conduct outside its territory - assuming
such jurisdiction exists can be said to be 'jurisdiction based on territory. .. .'
To make our position absolutely plain, we would say that we agree with the
sentence in the commentary. . . to the effect that the 'mere fact that the con-
duct takes place partly or completely outside of the territory does not bar the
State from dealing with it.' But we do not agree with the sentence which imme-
diately precedes this one, namely, the sentence which reads '[a] State may, when
there is sufficient relationship between its territory and conduct occurring
outside out it, treat such conduct on the same basis as conduct occurring in its
territory.' The words in italics seem to us to be illogical and tend to make more
difficult a sound classification of the various bases of jurisdiction. . . .
We wish to make it plain that this recommendation is not connected with
any view we may have formed as to the proper limits for the extraterritorial
application of the United States anti-trust laws .... But, even if we should
hold the view that in no instance has the application of the United States anti-
trust laws exceeded the proper limits fixed by international law, we should still
recommend the suppression of paragraph (c) for the reason which we have al-
ready mentioned, namely, that the exercise of jurisdiction over conduct occur-
ring entirely outside the territory could not constitute a form of jurisdiction
based on territory.
It will be noticed that our recommendation in regard to section 8 would
bring that section very much into line with Article 3 of the Harvard Draft Con-
vention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (1935). Indeed, we find ourselves
in agreement with that article and its underlying reasoning ....
Where we seem to differ from the reporters of Tentative Draft No. 2 is in
drawing a distinction - which is also drawn by the reporters of the Harvard Re-
search Draft - between the 'essential constituent elements' of the criminal con-
duct on the one hand and its mere 'effects' on the other hand. In our view, the
exercise of 'Jurisdiction based on Territory' is not justified in cases where all
that has occurred within the territory is the effects of certain conduct and not at
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"while the factors enumerated by the Restatement may well be
reasonably prerequisite to a State's justifiably prescribing rules to
govern foreign conduct, they nonetheless fail adequately to define
limits of jurisdiction which are acceptable under theretofore estab-
lished principles of international law as interpreted by most lead-
ing commercial nations.""s
The most important question which arises in relation to this
third criticism, is whether, under principles of international law, a
State may legally assume jurisdiction over conduct by foreigners
abroad only because of "effects," even though the relevant effects
are limited to ones which the State determines are "constituent
elements" of the act. The mere verdict by the State or its courts is
not itself a conclusive basis of jurisdiction under international law,
at least not jurisdiction based on any modification of the territorial
principle."9 Moreover, it is not only the assumption of jurisdiction
least part of the conduct itself. Id. at 538-39 [hereinafter cited as European
Communities].
Cf. Professor Metzger's criticism of the final draft of section 18 - with the exception of the
'constituent elements' formula in para. (b)(1). Metzger, The Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States: Bases and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv.
7, 15 (1966).
Comment f of Section 18 specifically notes that "[tihe fact that a substantial number of
states with reasonably developed legal systems do not recognize certain conduct and its ef-
fects as constituent elements of crimes or torts does not prevent a State which chooses to do
so from prescribing rules which make such conduct and its effects constituent elements of
activity which is either criminal, tortious, or subject to regulation." Nor would a particular
rule be deemed inconsistent with "generally recognized principles of justice" by virtue of the
fact that "most States with reasonably developed legal systems [do not] ...have a similar
rule." RSTATE Mzr, supra note 27, § 18, comment g.
58. COMMON MARKET, supra note 19, at 390.
59. Id. at 391. In 1972 the International Law Association, in reformulating the proposed
rules of international law, offered the following provisions:
ARTICLE 3
(1) A State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules governing the conduct of an alien
outside of its territory provided:-
a) part of the conduct being a constituent element of the offence occurs
within the territory; and
b) acts or omissions outside the territory are constituent elements of the
same offence.
(2) Whereas municipal law is the sole authority for the purpose of ascertaining
the constituent elements of a particular offence, international law retains a
residual but overriding authority to specify what is or is not capable of being a
constituent element for the purpose of determining jurisdictional competence.
ARTICLE 4
A State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules governing conduct originating outside
its territory if and in so far as such conduct is implemented within its territory
by any natural or legal person whose conduct can be attributed to the author of
the conduct performed abroad.
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based on effects which is in dispute, but whether there should be
limitations on the enforcement measures and orders employed by
the court.60 If Section 18 of the Restatement provides a valid basis
for the assumption of jurisdiction by the United States, then the
same holds true for other States if they discern "effects" within
their territory.
II. THE Timberlane DECISION AND THE DOCTRINE OF
COMPARATIVE RELATIONS
In 7imberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 6"
the court took a new approach to the issue of territorial application
of jurisdiction. Judge Choy pointed out that the "effects" test as
previously applied by the courts, was "by itself... incomplete,
and did not show the proper respect for the sovereignty of other
nations .... 62 [I]t is evident that at some point the interests of
the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive
for restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of ju-
risdiction."" The court also suggested that emphasis laid on "sub-
stantial effects" may not be entirely appropriate or may be confus-
ing in foreign commerce matters, thereby obscuring the issue of
"whether the interests of and connections to the United States are
sufficient, vis-a-vis foreign States, to justify extraterritorial appli-
cation."" The court stated:
An effect on United States commerce, although necessary to the
exercise of jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, is alone not a
sufficient basis on which to determine whether American author-
ity should be asserted in a given case as a matter of interna-
tional comity and fairness. In some cases, the application of the
direct and substantial test in the international context might
open the door too widely by sanctioning jurisdiction over an ac-
ARTICLE 5
A State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing conduct that occurs
outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory if:
a) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies;
b) the effect within the territory is substantial, and
c) it occurs as a direct and primarily intended result of the conduct
outside the territory. Naw YORK REPORT, supra note 6, at 139.
60. This point is illustrated by the Swiss Watch case, supra note 26.
61. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Timberlane].
62. Id. at 611-12.
63. Id. at 609.
64. Id. at 613.
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tion when these considerations would indicate dismissal. At
other times, it may fail in the other direction, dismissing a case
for which comity and fairness do not require forebearance, thus
closing the jurisdictional door too tightly - for the Sherman
Act does reach some restraints which do not have both a direct
and substantial effect on the foreign commerce of the United
States. A more comprehensive inquiry is necessary. We believe
that the field of conflict of laws presents the proper approach
65
The Timberlane case called for a tripartite analysis for all cases
involving the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws, rather
than an "effects" test:
1) Does the alleged restraint affect or was it intended to affect
the foreign commerce of the United States?
2) Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a
violation of the Sherman Act?
3) As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to
cover it? 6
The change in approach suggested by the first two questions is
separating the consideration of subject matter jurisdiction from
the consideration of the existence of a substantial violation of the
antitrust laws. 6 7 These two issues involve two different kinds of
"effects" which, as previous cases have emphasized, require indi-
vidual treatment." The first question deals with the effect on for-
65. Id.
66. Id. at 615.
67. A conscious effort on part of the court to separate these two questions can be judg-
ed from the changes made in the Timberlane opinion before it was published. In the slip
opinion, the section dealing with the "effects doctrine" was entitled Subject Matter Juris-
diction, and there was no mention of the tripartite analysis. In the amended opinion, this
section is entitled the Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Antitrust Laws and cov-
ers not only subject matter jurisdiction, but also an examination of the effects needed to
state a claim and a conflicts approach to be taken by courts to determine whether jurisdic-
tion should be exercised. The major purpose of the amended opinion was to clarify the role
of these three parts in the analysis of the case. The change in title as mentioned above,
emphasizes that the tripartite analysis is not limited to the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Question two is not relevant to the issue of whether jurisdiction exists; it is aimed at
the merits of the case. Compare 549 F.2d at 608, 612-13 with Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., Civ. No. 74-2142, at 15, 22-23 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 1976).
68. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331
F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). See also, Comment, The Confusing World of Interstate
Commerce and Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act, 21 VILL. L. Rav. 721, 724-25 & n. 28
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eign commerce, whereas the second addresses itself to an effect on
competition, the essential element of any antitrust violation."'
The court viewed the first question as the single determining
factor as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. However,
the extent to which this effect must be felt in order to assume ju-
risdiction has rarely been taken into consideration, even in domes-
tic antitrust matters.7"
One writer is of the opinion that "[ilf the Timberlane ap-
proach to subject matter jurisdiction is followed it is difficult to
envision a foreign act which will not be deemed to have some effect
upon our foreign commerce. Taken by itself, the first part of
Timberlane's tripartite test asserts United States jurisdictional
power to a greater extent than has ever before been suggested.
7 1
Thus, the first test would extend the United States jurisdiction
further over acts which were intended to affect its foreign com-
merce, even if they did not actually affect it. Such acts represent
an unprecedented and unilateral extension of jurisdictional power,
thereby causing concern to other States.
The second question, whether there is a violation of the Sher-
man Act, is clearly directed at the merits of the case. 72 It presup-
poses that the basic requirements of subject matter jurisdiction
have been met and proceeds to ask whether the facts are sufficient
to state a claim under the antitrust laws.7' The opinion itself did
not give any guidance for future applications of the first two tests.
It merely noted the allegation that the activities of the Bank of
America "were intended to, and did, affect. . . the flow of United
States foreign commerce,' ' 7 and on that basis found the requisite
federal jurisdiction. As to the second question, Judge Choy as-
serted that "the magnitude of the effect alleged . . . [was] suffi-
cient to state a claim."'75 In a footnote, however, he did point out
that those domestic antitrust cases requiring a substantial effect on
commerce could "offer some guidance for determining the degree
of restraint necessary to support a claim for relief in the foreign
(1976).
69. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., d.
70. ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 8.
71. Fry, Antitrust - Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Effects Doctrine - A Con-
flict Approach, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 354, 357-58 (1977).
72. See, supra note 67.
73. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
74. Timberlane, supra note 61, at 615.
75. Id.
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commerce context as well.'7 Judge Choy noted further that in do-
mestic interstate cases a "'substantial' restraint [effect on compe-
tition] [was] in any event necessary for the establishment of juris-
diction itself."
7 7
The third and most important test, grows primarily out of the
court's recognition of international comity considerations fre-
quently present in foreign commerce cases. The court put forth the
question, "whether the interests of, and links to, the United States
- including the magnitude of the effect on the foreign commerce
- are sufficiently strong, vis-&-vis those of other nations, to justify
an assertion of extraterritorial authority? '"'
In answering that question, the opinion sets forth the follow-
ing criteria:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
(2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the location
or principal places of business of corporations,
(3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be ex-
pected to achieve compliance,
(4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere,
(5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or af-
fect American commerce,
(6) the foreseeability of such effect, and
(7) the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with the conduct
abroad.7
°
Having outlined the "conflict," the courts in the United States
must then determine whether, in the face of it, the contacts and
interest suffice to justify the United States taking extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 0
76. Id. at 615 n. 35.
77. Id. Judge Choy relied on Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425
U.S. 738 (1976). This reliance reflects a misreading of that case. The issue in this case was
whether the actions allegedly taken by a local hospital and its officers to prevent the expan-
sion of another local hospital constituted an anticompetitive restraint substantially affecting
interstate commerce. The court held, that, because an increase in purchases of supplies from
out of state would result from any expansion, any activities restricting such an expansion
would substantially affect interstate commerce, 425 U.S. at 744. Fry, supra note 71, at 362.
78. Timberlane, supra note 61, at 613.
79. Id. at 614.
80. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division has
stated that Timberlane does not require a balancing of "interests of the United States par-
ties against those of the [foreign) nations," but rather "that the interests of the United
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In the past two decades, these standards have been recom-
mended by some writers,8' one of whom has suggested that "taking
all things into consideration [in applying the old effects doctrine]
we were showing a politically unwise disrespect for the interests
and prerogatives of other nations. 6s2 In Timberlane, the court re-
lied heavily on the proposals suggested by Brewster,8 and also on
the conflict of laws approach in the Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law.
8 4
A reliance on Section 40 and on the criteria established by the
court has been questioned on several grounds.8 5 Professor Rahl
comments:
[T]he idea of balancing "vital national interests" of other na-
tions by a national court is likely to seem somewhat presumptu-
ous to the foreign state concerned, notwithstanding the qualifi-
cations of the judges. "Self-judging" is not likely to elicit
enthusiasm from those who are judged to be wrong - especially
since what is involved falls outside the area of generally ac-
cepted crimes and torts."
He further states that, "[rieliance upon Sections 18(b) and 40 of
the Restatement clearly will not suffice." 8
States in prosecuting the violation be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively
against the potential damage to United States foreign relations generally that might result."
Shenefield, Address before the ABA International Law Section in New York, August 9,
1978.
81. See F. BREWSTER, TRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 445-46 (1958); CoMMON
MARKET, supra note 19, at 409-16; Victor, Multinational Corporations: Antitrust Extrater-
ritoriality and the Prospect of Immunity, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 11, 27-28 (1973); Zwaren-
steyn, The Foreign Reach of the American Antitrust Laws, 3 AM. Bus. L.J. 163, 170-71
(1965).
82. F. BREWSTER, at 286.
83. Brewster recommended that the following criteria be considered: "(a) the relative
significance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with
conduct abroad; (b) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
consumers or American's business opportunity; (c) the relative seriousness of effects on the
United States as compared with those abroad; (d) the nationality or allegiance of the parties
or in the case of business associations, their corporate location and the fairness of our apply-
ing the law to them; (e) the degree of conflict with foreign laws and policies; and (f) the
extent to which conflict can be avoided without serious impairment of the interests of the
United States or the foreign country." Id., at 446.
84. Section 18 of the Restatement deals with the prescriptive jurisdiction of a State to
prescribe rules of law. Section 40 modifies the impact of Section 18, and the balance of the
court's criteria were borrowed from Section 40 of the Restatement.
85. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 42-43.
86. Id. at 44.
87. Id.
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Since Alcoa, Timberlane is the most important decision rele-
vant to the "extraterritorial" application of the Sherman Act."
Timberlane has outlined the steps necessary to analyze questions
of jurisdiction over extraterritorial antitrust violations, but unfor-
tunately the court did not make a definite statement of when ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction will be exercised. By leaving this issue
unanswered, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is still at
the discretion of the court. By weighing the interests of other na-
tions against those of the United States, the court attempted to
show its deference to the* sovereignty of other nations. However,
the fact remains that it is still the United States courts that will
decide whether the United States laws should apply to acts abroad.
Furthermore, the Justice Department's International Antitrust
Guidelines are quite consistent with the decision in Timberlanee9
and reflect governmental support for the doctrine of "effects,"
which adds yet another factor to the problem of extraterritoriality.
The recent case law in the United States supports the adop-
tion of a comparative relation analysis. In three recent decisions,"0
the courts have applied a conflict of laws analysis in order to deter-
mine whether jurisdiction should be exercised. This analysis, which
evaluates a full range of relevant factors in order to determine the
question of jurisdiction, is clearly a better tool than the more re-
stricted effects test.9e The comparative relations test would deter-
mine which State's rules should govern a situations' on the basis of
which State has the most powerful relation-based interest in regu-
lating the relevant conduct. This test itself has general formula-
88. Id.
89. U.S. Dept. of Justice, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6-7 (1977),
reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,309 (Mar. 14, 1977).
90. For the analysis of Timberlane, see preceding discussion. See discussion below for
the two other recent decisions.
91. In Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., the court, after applying the "balancing"
test prescribed in Timberlane, declared itself to be without jurisdiction because the extra-
territorial action had "too insignificant an effect on . . . commerce to justify federal court
jurisdiction." The renuniciation of jurisdiction was not, however, based on the application of
international law. No. 79-1999 (10th Cir., Oct. 14, 1981). Comment, Defenses to Actions
Against Foreign States Under the United States Antitrust Laws, 20 HARv. J. INT'L L. 583,
617 (1979).
92. "[S]urely the test which determines whether United States law is applicable must
focus on the nexus between the parties and their practices and the United States, not on the
mechanical circumstances of effect on commodity exports or imports." Pacific Seafarers Inc.
v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093
(1969). See generally, Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the Interna-
tional Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586 (1961).
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tions.93 The strongest factor against such a test lies in the fact that
the domestic court would sit as a transnational court and make a
comparative determination of which State's law should govern.
Professor Falk remarks: "The essence of horizontal order [the situ-
ation in which there is no centralized authority] is that rational
self-limitation should take maximum account of the existence of
other states and give effect to a mutually satisfactory standard of
reciprocity." Justice Jackson stated it thus:
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmind-
ful of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to
be avoided; nor should we forget that any contact which we hold
sufficient to warrant application of our laws to a foreign transac-
tion will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to
apply its law to an American transaction."s
The reciprocal self-limitation among States and the treatment
accorded by one State to another needs to be strengthened. It has
been said that: "If states and their courts act so as to promote such
a value, rather than mere reciprocity, the division tendencies of a
system based upon state sovereignty might well be ameliorated. '""
The third circuit, in Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp.,97 followed the Timberlane approach of applying a conflict of
laws analysis to the jurisdictional issue. The case involved allega-
tions that the defendant, a United States corporation, fraudulently
obtained foreign patents which were used as a means to harm the
plaintiff. Under the Alcoa "intent and effects" test, the court noted
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. 8 However, the court
93. See, e.g., Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations -
Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519 (1971).
94. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMEsTic COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 51
(1964).
95. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
96. Comment, supra note 91, at 618. The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws
states: "When there is no such [statutory] directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b)
the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue. ... Kintner,
Joelson and Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust Law, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 75,
77 (1973) states: "It is submitted that the legal system of any one country is inadequate in
its efforts to curb restrictive business practices in an international setting both because of
the inherent limitations of a system which is based primarily on protection of one's own
national market and industry .... "
97. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). For a general discussion on the case, see, Foreign
Investment: Joint Venture Law, 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 667 (1979).
98. Id. at 1292. The court noted that the "intended effects" test has been approved by
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then considered whether jurisdiction should be exercised," agree-
ing mainly with Timberlane on the factors to be considered.1"
In Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus-
tries,101 the district court agreed with Timberlane and Mannington
Mills that "the effects test alone is inadequate, because it fails to
take into account potential problems of international comity."10'
However, the court did not indicate which approach to the com-
parative relations doctrine is best; it did not choose between the
use of the doctrine as a threshold test and its use as a doctrine of
abstention.103
It is highly desirable that certain rules to regulate anti-com-
petitive conduct are formulated, and that the application of a sin-
gle State's laws to conduct abroad on the basis of effects should
generally be avoided because of its potentially disintegrative ef-
the Supreme Court, citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 705 (1961). However in Continental Ore, the Supreme Court used Alcoa merely to
support the proposition that "[a] conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or for-
eign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just be-
cause part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries." Id. at 704.
99. Supra note 91, at 1294. The court finds support for the further analysis in SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 431 U.S. 438 (1977) (applying securities laws to
transnational cases where some conduct occurs within the United States), and Straub v.
Vasiman & Co. Inc., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding conduct within the United States
sufficient for the application of United States securities law). These cases base assertion of
jurisdiction in part on policy rationales. See also, Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d Cir. 1972).
100. The court in Mannington Mills considered the following factors:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of [sic] the alleged violation of conduct here compared
to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting require-
ments by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable if made by the foreign na-
tion under the similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations had addressed the issue.
101. [1979-2 Trade Cas.] TaaDE REG. RmP. (CCH) 1 62,757 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
102. Id. at 78, 368. The court noted that Mannington Mills treated the conflict-of-laws
issue as a question of abstention whereas Timberlane treated it as a threshold jurisdictional
issue. Id.
103. Id.
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fects upon international trade. Brewster has stated that "[tihe use
of regulatory law to assert this adversary economic interest is an
open invitation to outrage and retaliation, a progressive anarchy of
legal conflict. It is the very negation of comity and the promise of
international legal order.'" If any state were to use its economic,
political, or military power to enforce the judgments of its peculiar
legal phenomenon on a foreign sovereign, the satisfaction would be
at the expense of the development of international law that might
precipitate unfortunate reactions, such as retaliation.'0 5
III. OBSERVANCE AND INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
THE UNITED STATES COURTS IN APPLYING ITS LAWS
EXTRATERRITORIALLY
In conjunction with recent United States legal decisions, inter-
national law itself supports the adoption of the comparative rela-
tions doctrine to determine the applicability of United States laws
to extraterritorial conduct.'" Furthermore, international law as-
sists in the interpretation of United States law,z07 and provides rel-
evant standards for determining whether the anti-competitive con-
duct has a stronger influence on the United States than on other
States, and whether regulation of the conduct by the United States
is warranted. The Supreme Court held that "[i]nternational law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.'1 8 This principle has
always been conditioned on there being "no controlling executive
or legislative act."'" For instance, in The Over the Top"0 it was
held that "[an] act [of Congress] may contravene recognized prin-
ciples of international comity, but that affords no more basis for
judicial disregard of it than it does for executive disregard of it.""'
However, the practice of the courts reflects that they have adopted
a "clear statement" doctrine which has influenced the extraterrito-
rial application of antitrust laws. This doctrine refers to the pre-
sumption that Congress intends to comply with international law
104. BREWSMR, supra note 81 at 298.
105. Comment, supra note 91, at 69.
106. Id.
107. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925).
111. Id. at 842.
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unless the contrary is unavoidable. " '
In determining the international legality of the extraterritorial
application of United States antitrust laws, it is important to con-
sider, as evidence of customary international law, the trend among
other States.118 Two aspects of these trends are especially impor-
tant and require attention: the international consensus concerning
the extraterritorial application of national antitrust legislation
based merely on effects, and the presence or absence of an interna-
tional anti-competitive standard which might serve to legitimize
such an application. The extraterritorial application of national
legislation has always been protested, and such an act has been
considered to be an infringement of State sovereignty." 4
In the past, the United States was long the only State with a
vigorous antitrust enforcement policy. Since World War II, how-
ever, there has been a remarkable antitrust legislative movement
not only in the developed but also in the developing nations.1 5 In
112. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812): "(U]ntil
such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be consid-
ered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction which it would be a breach
of faith to exercise." FALK, supra note 94, at 126-73.
113. In Alcoa, Judge Hand stated: "[Wie are concerned only with whether Congress
chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States of persons not in alle-
giance to it . . . . [A]s a court of the United States we cannot look beyond our own law.
Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as those in [the
Sherman Act], without regard to the limitation customarily observed by nations upon the
exercise of their powers .. " Supra note 4, at 443; In Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far
East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969), Judge
Levanthal stated that "it may fairly be inferred, in the absence of clear showing to the
contrary, that Congress did not intend an application [of the Sherman Act] that would vio-
late principles of international law." Id. at 814.
114. F. BREWSTER, supra note 81 at 45-51; W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 50-51.
115. W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 467: "Rather surprisingly, many nations which are not
primarily industrial have enacted antitrust law." See, Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm. 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1965).
They include Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. For a description of the
laws of Argentina and Brazil, see UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive Business Practices in
Latin America, U.N. Doc. ST/MD/4 (1975). For a description of the laws of India, Pakistan
and Yugoslavia, see UNCTAD, Laws and Regulations Relating to the Control of Restrictive
Practices, at 9-41, 56-58, 69-75, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.5/Misc.1 (1975). "Many of the de-
veloping countries look to the traditional U.S. concern for the development of infant indus-
tries, and thus have displayed a tendency to regard antitrust laws as applicable primarily to
large foreign firms rather than to their fledgling enterprises at home." Davidow, Extraterri-
torial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law In a Changing World, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 897
(1976). See, U.N. ECOSOC, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the Develop-
ment Process and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Add.l/Rev. 1-ST/ESA/6
(1974). Other countries, Mexico, for example, have legislation aimed at monopolies and un-
fair business practices rather than strictly antitrust laws. Some other Latin American coun-
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addition, a number of States have enacted "counter legislation"
against the extraterritorial application of foreign national laws to
cases which they considered as coming under their sovereignty." '
tries have constitutional provisions against monopoly. "In 1954, only 8 member nations of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had enough interest
in antitrust law to send a delegation to meetings of the Ad Hoe Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECOSOC). By 1973, antitrust legislation embodying rules comparable to those found in
U.S. law had been adopted by more than half of the 23 members of OECD. FUGATE, Id. The
European Economic Community (EEC), which applies competition rules to nine members
and a number of associate nations, has developed a sophisticated and stringent system for
the regulation of competition influenced by U.S. experience and values. See, Thompson,
The Competition Policy of the European Community, 9 J. WORLD TRADE LAW 79 (1975).
116. The most recent and the striking counter legislation was enacted by the British
Government "Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980" BRITISH STATUTE SIGNED
BY QUEEN ELIZABETH ON MARCH 20, 1980, TO PROTECT BRITISH INTERESTS
FROM FOREIGN ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS, BNA, ATRR, (no. 95a) F-1 (4-10-80); The
United States has no comparable laws for the protection of its citizens against actions of
foreign antitrust authorities. Germany has no law comparable to the Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980. On one occasion, in connection with the United States antitrust activi-
ties against the international freight conferences in the sixties, Germany reacted by altering
section 11 of the law relative to the powers of the German Federal Authorities in the Field
of the Merchant Marine. The Federal Minister for Communications has used this power by
issuing a regulation of December 14, 1966, according to which any disclosure of documents
to or answer to a request for information by a foreign authority needs the permission of the
Federal Minister. In extraordinary cases, in which foreign antitrust authorities might try to
collect information or carry out searches in Germany, pretending to act by authorization of
a German authority this would be a violation of German criminal law (section 132 StGB).
No provision exists under EEC law for protection of Community nationals or residents
against actions of foreign antitrust authorities. As far as French companies are concerned,
French law does not contain any special procedure regarding requests of foreign States. Al-
though Switzerland has no specific provision in law for protecting its citizens and companies
against actions or foreign administrative agencies, there are a series of provisions in its penal
system which contribute to establishing such protection. See, PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAws, Report Submitted to Committee C -
Antitrust Law and Monopolies during the IBA Berlin Conference, 99-105 (August 1980).
There is Canadian Legislation proposed which will protect Canadian corporations and
citizens from the reach of U.S. Antitrust laws. The bill was introduced July 11, 1980 by
Marc Lalonde, the minister for Energy, Mines and Resources, on behalf of Justice Minister
Jean Chretien. The "Foreign Proceedings and Judgments Bill" would prevent the enforce-
ment of foreign antitrust judgments in Canada when, in the opinion of the Attorney General
of Canada, such action would harm Canadian international trade and commerce. BNA,
Daily Report for Executives, DER No. 142, A-14, July 22, 1980. Another such retaliation
comes from Australia, Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act of
1979, No. 13, Austi. Acts (1979). The adoption of the Act by the Australian Parliament
illustrates Australia's disagreement with the extraterritorial application of United States an-
titrust laws and underscores some of the basic conflicts in this area. The Act was adopted in
response to a default judgment entered against four Australian uranium producers in a
United States antitrust suit brought by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. See Ausn.
PARL. DER. S. (Weekly Hansard No. 1, 1979) 127-29 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Durack).
Some States have set up notification and consultation mechanisms with the United
States, through which they could discuss the application of the United States antitrust leg-
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What one can infer from the prevailing practice is that all
countries are under increasing pressure to extend their laws, either
to deal more effectively with the great expansion of international
trade and investment, especially in the area of multinational enter-
prises, or to use their laws to deal with the extraterritorial applica-
tion of another State's domestic legislation in their territory. As a
consequence, an increasing number of countries are adopting anti-
trust-type laws.
There are countries other than the United States where na-
tional legislations have also been applied extraterritorially but on
different grounds. For instance, a Japanese administrative agency
has applied Japanese anti-monopoly law extraterritorially where
there was territorial conduct."1 7 The European Economic Commu-
nity applies its competition laws extraterritorially although mere
effects would not constitute a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. In
Raymond Nagoya,"8 the Commission stated that an agreement
granting a license for Eastern Asia did not affect competition
within the Common Market. This means, however, that in cases
where export to the Common Market is possible, any restriction of
the Eastern Asian licensee to export would, in the opinion of the
Commission, violate Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. In Imperial
Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission," the Court of Justice of
the European Communities permitted extraterritorial jurisdiction,
but did so on the basis of conduct rather than effects." s0 From
these judgments one may reasonably conclude that so far the Eu-
ropean court has not expressly approved the "effects" doctrine.
islation to their nationals. See, Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Re-
strictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States - Federal Republic of Germany, 27
U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291; Joint Statement Concerning Cooperation in Anti-Trust Mat-
ters, November 3, 1969, Canada - United States, reprinted in 8 INr'L LEGAL MATS. 1305
(1969); Retaliatory legislation is not only confined to antitrust but to other areas as well,
such as production of evidence or records.
117. Yazawa, Recent Developments in Japan, INT'L LAW ASS'N REPoRr OF THE FIFTY-
FOURTH CONFERENCE 183-84 (1970). See also, Yazawa, International Transactions and the
Japanese Antimonopoly Act, 4 LAWASIA 169 (1973).
118. Decision of 09.66.1979 - Raymond Nagoya - O.J. Nr.L. 143(39.
119. Court of Justice of the European Communities, Case No. 48/69, [19721 ECR 619.
120. Id. The Commission's reasoning reached nearly as far as that of Alcoa, but the
court did not adopt the effects test. See, Pappalardo, Common Market Antitrust Extrater-
ritorial Application, ANNUAL PROCEzDNGS OF THE FORDHAM CoRPORArE LAW INsrrrur E; IN-
TERNATIONAL ANTIRUST 109, 110-12 (1975). The Commission treated the case as demanding
jurisdiction based on effects; however, the European Court in its review of the case, based
jurisdiction on the existence of control and direct orders between parent and subsidiary. Id.,
at 112.
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The United States position on the validity in international law
of the extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws is quite clear
from Section 18(b) of the Restatement.121 It endorses the assump-
tion of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on mere effects, but
draws its origin from the Alcoa and Lotus cases, which were based
on the principle of objective territoriality. Even if the Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas'1 2 had not overruled the holding in Lo-
tus, the extraterritorial application of the penal law of manslaugh-
ter is distinguishable from the extraterritorial application of
antitrust laws. The universal condemnation of manslaughter, as
distinguished from the parochial character of competition law,
makes the extraterritorial application of one State's law acceptable
in the Lotus situation, 12 but there is no indication that anything
less than the universally recognized law is acceptable to apply ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction.' It has been stated that "although in-
ternational law does not clearly proscribe jurisdiction based solely
upon effects, it clouds the legitimacy of the exercise of such
jurisdiction. '"
Thus, the international norms with respect to the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction based upon mere effects are not clear,
especially when there exists no consensus among the States as to
the proper exercise of extraterritorial application of national legis-
lation based on effects alone. Since an increasing number of coun-
tries are adopting antitrust-type laws, it is arguable that the in-
crease in such legislation strongly evidences a trend of emerging
customary international law in this field. However, such an argu-
ment may be rebutted by the fact that in most cases the reasons
for adoption of antitrust or similar laws are entirely different from
those of the United States.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF EFFECTS DOCTRINE TO RESTRICTIONS ON
ExPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES
The decisions discussed above concern arrangements which to
some extent have had an impact on the United States foreign com-
merce and have affected mainly imports into the United States.
121. RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 18.
122. CONVENTION ON THE HIoH SEAS, art. 11(1), April 29, 1959, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
123. See, Jennings, supra note 5; ToKYo REPORT, supra note 3, at 362-85.
124. Id.
125. Comment, supra note 97, at 623.
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However, restrictions affecting exports raise different issues and
may entail different policy considerations from those raised by re-
strictions affecting imports. It has been suggested that the two in-
stances should be distinguished even if the same general criteria
are employed, i.e. Alcoa's "intent and effect" test or Timberlane's
balancing approach.' 26
There are fewer cases dealing with the issue of of the Sherman
Act's applicability to restrictions affecting exports rather than im-
ports, but the Sherman Act does apply to exports, as was most
recently stated in Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India.
12 7
Exportation from the United States has different variations,
and assumptions regarding jurisdiction vary accordingly. One in-
stance is where the alleged restraint on exports adversely affects
the United States competitors, irrespective of whether the act con-
stituting restraint took place in the United States or abroad.'"
The effects on competitors may be direct or indirect.1 9 An indirect
effect can be caused by an agreement among companies to coordi-
nate exports, which might have a spillover anti-competitive effect
on the relevant market.130
The majority of the decisions upholding Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion on the basis of restraints on exports are amenable to the di-
rect effects test. The export cases do not raise many issues differ-
ent from those raised in cases involving effects on imports.
Therefore, the restraints affecting exports (affecting the United
States competitors) are treated for jurisdictional purposes in much
the same way as restraints affecting imports. 
1 3
126. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 45.
127. See, 98 S.Ct. 584, 588 n.11 (1978) where the majority stated: "The dissent seems to
contend that the Sherman Act's reference to commerce with foreign nations was intended
only to reach conspiracies affecting goods imported into this country. .... But the scope of
congressional power over foreign commerce has never been so limited, and it is established
that antitrust laws apply to exports as well." See, e.g., Timber Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp.
947 (D. Mass. 1950).
128. For example, a conspiracy among United States manufacturers to pool foreign pat-
ents in order to prevent other United States manufacturers from exposing to those States
covered by the patents. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 45.
129. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), the effects
were direct. See also, Pacific Seafarers Inc. v. Pacific Far East Lines, 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
130. Cf. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 127.
131. B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 46-52.
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V. DOCTRINE OF EFFECTS AND THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE
In determining the applicability of the protective principle as
a basis of jurisdiction in an economic crime, the question arises as
to whether the particular economic activity is perceived by other
nations as a threat to the affected State's security, thereby war-
ranting the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It has been sug-
gested that:
Proponents of extraterritoriality would argue that enforced com-
petition is no less an instrument of public ordering than the ac-
tivities of the state itself would be in a nationalized industry. Or
they might draw upon the exchange control analogy and argue
that the maintenance of the integrity of the competitive system
is no less important to the functioning of the [State] economy
than is the maintenance of the value of the nation's currency.
Both have been contended by some States to justify them in
specifying the terms on which business can be done with the
economy or the currency respectively.' 5
According to the Restatement:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threat-
ens its security as a State or the operation of its governmental
functions provided the conduct is generally recognized as a
crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems.
(2) Conduct referred to in Subsection (1) includes in particular
the counterfeiting of the state's seals and currency, and the fal-
sification of its official documents.'
Under this principle, a foreigner may be prosecuted by an of-
fended State for an act committed wholly outside its territory.
There need be no "effects" within the borders of the offended
State.'"' One can see that this principle is easily capable of abuse.
132. F. BREWSTER, supra note 81, at 296.
133. RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, at § 33.
134. In United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1968), Judge Medina
stated the principle as follows: "[T]he objective territorial principle is quite distinct from
the protective theory. Under the latter, all the elements of the crime occur in the foreign
country and jurisdiction exists because these actions have a 'potentially adverse effect' upon
security and governmental functions (Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law, Com-
ment to Section 33 at p. 33), and there need not be any actual effect in the country as would
be required under the objective territorial principle. Courts have often failed to perceive this
distinction. Thus, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding a conviction under a factual situation
similar to the one in the instant case, relied on the protective theory, but still felt con-
1982]
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
Professor Mann has pointed out:
[lilt is clear that States must make a reasonable and just assess-
ment of acts which so much affect their interests as to make it
proper to impose punishment for them irrespective of the iden-
tity of place and person. It would be abusive if a State invoked
the protective principle without due regard to the importance of
the offence. In all cases, here as elsewhere, the standard is sup-
plied solely by international law, i.e. by the general practice of
the civilised States.35
Not only is the principle susceptible to abuse but it could also
lead to friction among States. For instance, what one State might
consider an essential freedom to be enjoyed by its nationals, an-
other might consider prejudicial to its national interests. Harvard
Research sets forth the protective principle in Article 7, but with a
proviso restricting such jurisdiction to instances in which "the act
or omission which constitutes the crime was not committed in ex-
ercise of liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place where
it was committed."' 6 A comparable restriction is provided in Sec-
tion 33 of the Restatement, with the explanation that the limita-
tion "prevents a state from basing an extension of its jurisdiction
on the rule. .. "137
The possibility of utilizing the protective principle to justify
the application of national antitrust legislation was considered in a
comment to Section 32 of Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restate-
ment.13 8 It was, however, rejected. The utilization of the protective
principle was likened to the doctrine of public policy in conflict of
laws and abandoned, because such a principle does not lend itself
strained to say that jurisdiction rested partially on the adverse effect produced as a result of
the alien's entry into the United States. The Ninth Circuit also cited Strassheim and Alu-
minum Company of America as support for its decision. With all due deference to our
brothers of the Ninth Circuit, however, we think this reliance is unwarranted. A violation of
18 U.S.C. Section 1546 is complete at the time the alien perjures himself in the foreign
country. It may be possible that the particular criminal sanctions of Section 1546 will never
be enforced unless the defendant enters the country, but entry is not an element of the
statutory offence. Were the statute re-drafted and entry made a part of the crime we
would then be presented with a clear case of jurisdiction under the objective territorial
principle." (emphasis added.)
135. Mann, supra note 37, at 94.
136. HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO CRIME,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 543 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD RESEARCH].
137. RESTATEMENT supra note 27, at § 33, comment d.
138. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Section 32
at 94 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958).
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to objectivity.5 s The European Advisory Committee, appointed by
the American Law Institute to advise on Tentative Draft No. 2,
was of the same opinion as expressed in the Tentative Draft No. 2.
The Committee stated: "[T]he protective principle does not, in our
opinion ordinarily apply to the protection by a State of its eco-
nomic policies, such as policies regarding the control of imports or
restrictive trade practices.
'" 0
The protective principle, as a basis of assuming jurisdiction on
effects, has been rejected on two major grounds: First, the competi-
tive trade policy is of a lower order of importance than those inter-
ests which have traditionally warranted extraterritorial reach on
the basis of effects alone. Second, by the application of economic
regulations extraterritorially, the level of conflict among States is
likely to rise. It has always been stated that the use of the protec-
tive principle is limited to matters affecting a State's security or
integrity, and at the same time it has been emphasized that the
security of a State is quite different from maintaining a particular
type of economic pattern or interest. Although one can always ar-
gue that the implementation of economic policies is as vital as the
security of the State itself, there is a consensus among interna-
tional jurists that the level of threat in both instances is not the
same and therefore the application of the protective principle is
not warranted."'
The major problem lies in the dissimilarity of laws related to
the same or closely similar policy goals. In instances where the ex-
ercise of regulatory laws of a State results in a conflicting economic
policy in another State, the situation offers an open invitation to
139. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
140. FINAL REPORT Or THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTr ON TENTATIVE DRAFT No.
2, RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (JURISDICTION) 30
(1961) (unpublished draft). Cf. The European Advisory Committee did not categorically re-
ject the protective principle. It advised: "We can see no reason why a State shall lose the
jurisdiction referred to in Article 7 of the Harvard Draft merely because the law of another
State on whose territory these acts are committed permit the preparation to do them....
Whether . . . jurisdiction may be exercised under the protective principle will depend, in
our view, on whether the acts committed by aliens outside the territory of the State are or
are not against its security, territorial integrity or political independence. We admit that
expressions such as 'security', 'territorial integrity' and 'political independence' are some-
what vague and difficult to define precisely. Nevertheless they are in general use in interna-
tional law and appear in the Charter of United Nations and other international trea-
ties .. " Id. at 27-30.
141. F. BREWSTER, supra note 81, at 297-98; TOKYO REPORT, supra note 3; COMMON
MARKET, supra note 19, at 397-401; W. FUGATE, supra note 1.
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outrage and retaliation.1 42 Such an act is the very negation of com-
ity and the promise of international legal order.
Since there is no consensus among different countries about
the merits of competition or about economic policies in general,
the exercise of jurisdiction over agreements made by foreigners
abroad on the basis of effects implies an intervention which may
be contrary to the express domestic policy of another State. The
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws may result in further
unfairness in instances where an alien is made accountable to stan-
dards he cannot foretell. 143 With regard to United States practice,
one writer remarks: "Instead of being an announced condition of
access to the American Market, it is arguably in fact a potential
trap which may be sprung as an unforeseeable consequence of do-
ing business in the United States." "'
It can be concluded that both the British and American courts
would deny the validity of the protective principle in economic af-
fairs as such, because of its inherent invitation to conflict among
States. 4 " One authority in the field suggests:
Indeed, to apply the protective principle as a basis for the extra-
territorial applicatton of antitrust laws would be releasing a
most "unruly horse," a danger the United States has long recog-
nized. If every state could determine for itself what protective
measures were necessary, and could punish every alien it might
catch who infringed those measures, the international commu-
nity would be far more chaotic than it is.""
VI. DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS AND THE EFFECTS
DOCTRINE
Harvard Research, in the commentary to Article 3, discusses
the doctrine of "constituent elements:"
The modern formula, incorporated in this article, recognizes
that there is territorial jurisdiction of any crime which is com-
mitted in whole or in part within the territory. A crime is com-
mitted "in whole" within the territory when every essential con-
stituent element is consummated within the territory, it is
consummated "in part" within the territory when any essential
142. See HAGUE REPORT, supra note 11.
143. F. BREWSTER, supra note 81.
144. Id. at 299.
145. Id. at 300.
146. COMMON MARKET, supra note 19, at 401.
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constituent element is consummated there. If it is committed ei-
ther "in whole or in part" within the territory, there is territorial
jurisdiction.""
The emphasis of the above commentary was to support jurisdiction
as objectively territorial so that some "essential constituent ele-
ment" of the conduct must have occurred within a State's bor-
der.' 48 One writer is of the opinion that "[a]n 'essential constituent
element' is something necessary to the completion of the crime;
i.e., without which the crime would not be legally proscribed. Mere
consequential or remote effects within the territory which are not
themselves essential ingredients of the offence are not
determinative.
'' 49
The spectrum of criminal activity classified as economic crime
is quite broad ' 50 and subject to differentiation in a number of
ways. However, there are common elements, including economic
motivations and reactions to economic incentives and deterrents.
One writer states:
[p]ractically, burglary is as much an economic crime as embez-
zlement or price fixing. However, in the lexicon of crime, bur-
glary is referred to as 'street crime,' embezzlement as 'white col-
lar crime' and price fixing as 'corporate crime'. These diverse
labels have no special utility in explaining criminal activity, dis-
couraging criminal behavior or effecting equal justice. All are
criminal yet each varies with respect to alternative to crime, op-
portunities for crime and response to probable punishment.'5 '
The actus reus of any crime is normally susceptible to being
analyzed by its different constituent elements. There is a general
consensus among nations to permit a State to assume jurisdiction
over the acts or omissions of a foreigner committed abroad, where
such conduct is a constituent element of an offence which, if it oc-
curred wholly within that State's territory, would be punishable
under its national law, provided that it can refer to some other
constituent element of the same act which has occurred within its
147. HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 495.
148. "Generally accepted and often applied is the objective territorial principle, accord-
ing to which jurisdiction is founded when any essential constituent element of a crime is
consummated on State territory." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 41, at 263.
149. COMMON MARKEr, supra note 19, at 376-77.
150. See, e.g., CHAMBER OF COMMERnCE OF THE UNrrEa STATES, WHrTE COLLAR CME
(1974).
151. Soloman, The Economist's Perspective of Economic Crime, 14 AM. CalM. L. REV.
641 (1977).
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territory. 52 The presence of "constituent elements" appears to
cause no problems for the assumption of jurisdiction in the classic
example of shooting across the border, where a State may prose-
cute conduct which commences within its border but is consu-
mated abroad or which commences abroad and is consummated at
home, provided only that the conduct which occurs within its own
border is a constituent element of the offence. Regarding this prin-
ciple, it was stated in the International Law Association's Report:
"It must, however, be firmly borne in mind that no international
tribunal has ever applied the principle outside the context of com-
mon crimes, that is offences involving some form of malum in
se."))15
The most important issue posed is whether the principle out-
lined in the above example can be applied in a broader context,
and in particular, whether it can be extended to economic offenses
which are mala prohibita. The problem revolves around the mean-
ing of the term "constituent element." In the commentary to Arti-
cle 3 the International Law Association states:
It seems clear to us that while it is for the municipal law of a
State to determine in the first instance what is a constituent ele-
ment of a particular offence, international law retains a residual
but overriding authority and international courts an obligation,
if called upon, to specify what is or is not capable of being a
constituent element for the purposes of assigning jurisdictional
competence.'"
The commentary states that in order for a State to assume juris-
diction, "it must be able to point to at least one integral part of the
actus reus which is recognized by international law, both as a con-
stituent element of the offence and as localized within the State's
territory."'5 5 One may disagree with the commentary, because the
determination of a constituent element of an economic crime by
municipal law is not practicable, especially when there are no
guidelines for such determination. As opposed to an economic
crime, the finding of a constituent element is not at all complicated
in a murder, since a murder is not deemed to have been committed
unless both the act which causes death and the death itself are
established. In other words, the act is not murderous unless a pre-
152. HAGUE REPORT, supra note 11, at 227.
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cisely defined result is produced. Moreover, the constituent ele-
ments of this kind of act are universally recognized.
The "constituent element" doctrine was suggested as an alter-
native to the "effects" doctrine, but the International Law Associa-
tion's studies indicated that the former doctrine has quite serious
drawbacks.'5" The major problem is that it has potential to allow
many anti-competitive practices to flourish and go unredressed.157
The second major criticism of the "constituent element" doctrine,
is "that it serves as an open invitation to the most intellectually
barren kind of legal conceptualism."' " At the Tokyo meeting of
the International Law Association, Professor Jaenicke pointed out
that "by skillful drafting of a penal statute" a State "can make any
effect of conduct abroad a constituent element of the crime.""
Another criticism of the "constituent element" doctrine is that "it
spends too much time defining what can be legitimately called
'conduct' within the territory of the prosecuting State, and not
enough time analyzing and balancing the various interests in-
volved in the extraterritorial application of the prosecuting State's
laws."
0
A discretionary judgment by a State as to what constitutes the
constituent elements of an economic crime is further complicated
where, unlike the situation in common crimes, what has occurred
within the territory of the State assuming jurisdiction cannot prop-
erly be characterized as an act of the alleged offender. In the con-
text of antitrust prosecutions there is every possibility that the act
committed abroad by foreigners may or may not be characterized
by having occurred within the territory of the aggrieved State, al-
though the act may well have had a substantial effect on the
State's economy.'"" Therefore, it is suggested that the determina-
tion of constituent elements in economic crimes should be only one
aspect of a broader judicial inquiry which includes various addi-
tional factors indicative of the State's relative interests in the
questioned conduct.
156. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 6, at 135.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 135-36.
159. TOKYO REPORT, supra note 3, at 319.
160. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 6, at 136.
161. Dr. Mann states "what the law considers relevant is, as a rule, the necessary legal
effect, not the ulterior effect, economically or socially." Supra note 37, at 87.
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VII. CONCLUSION
At present, international law has not developed sufficiently to
recognize "economic effects" as a separate basis for asserting juris-
diction. In contrast, it has been stated about the common crime
that "[tihe principle that a man who outside of a country wilfully
puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place
where the evil is done, is recognized in the criminal jurisdiction of
all countries."' 62 Furthermore, "the setting in motion outside of a
state of a force which produced as a direct consequence an injuri-
ous effect therein, justifies the territorial sovereign in prosecuting
the actor when he enters its domain."' 163
With regard to economic effects, the European Advisory Com-
mittee""4 stated: "In our view the exercise of 'Jurisdiction based on
Territory' is not justified in cases where all that has occurred
within the territory is the effects of certain conduct and not at
least part of the conduct itself."'16 In addition, the International
Law Association Report in 1966 stated: "At least half of the Com-
mittee go further and consider that contemporary international
law has not yet reached the stage, as evidenced by the response of
governments to jurisdictional claims, that would permit such intru-
sion into their domestic affairs. . . ."I" The 1970 Report stated:
Of course, underlying the technical and doctrinal objections to
the recognition of the "effects" doctrine is the substantial objec-
tion that antitrust laws are parochial in nature since they inti-
mately reflect a State's economic and political philosophy. It is
appropriate, therefore, that their operation should be restricted
within the limits of the State's sovereign authority. The notion
of the equality of sovereign nations from which all principles of
international jurisdiction are derived demands that States do
not intrude on the ordre public of other States.'
67
Therefore, there are arguments both for and against the recog-
nition of the doctrine of "effects" as an additional basis for the
assumption of jurisdiction. One can understand the frustration of a
justifiably aggrieved State which may wish to assume jurisdiction
162. Report on the Extra-territorial Crime and the "Cutting" Case, U.S. FoR_ Rn.
757, 771 (1887).
163. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 798 (2d rev. ed. 1947).
164. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 57.
165. TOKYo REPORT, supra note 3, at 539.
166. INT'L LAW Ass'N REPoR o ms FItry-SECOND CONFERENCE 141-42 (Helsinki 1966).
167. HAGUE REPORT, supra note 11, at 239.
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on the basis of "effects," yet is unable to refer to any element of
the offense as having being committed within its territory. On the
other hand, one can also understand the desperation of the States
whose entities may be exposed to legal actions merely because of
certain unintentional effects in the prosecuting State.
Certainly there is a vacuum, and it is less than clear how to
proceed when there is an activity in a foreign State which has its
impact in one or more jurisdictions. It has been suggested that "al-
though territoriality must remain a natural canon of construction,
it is bound to yield to some realistic considerations as situations
require, whether those considerations lead to jurisdictional expan-
sion or to greater inhibition than the territoriality test would pro-
duce."' 8 The above suggestion may be a realistic start to deal with
the application of national laws on the basis of "effects," but the
question remains how?
168. F. BRzwsrva, supra note 81, at 327.
19821
